U.S. Supreme Court Opens Door for More Retaliation Claims
In a unanimous decision handed down on January 26, 2009, the United States Supreme Court expanded the ability to sue for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In the case of Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, a discharged employee of the school district claimed that she was fired after she told internal investigators of the school district about the inappropriate conduct and sexual harassment by its employee relations director, Gene Hughes. She did not file a complaint against Hughes but she participated in the investigation and answered questions. During the interview, Ms. Vicky Crawford described several instances of sexually harassing behavior toward her, including one instance when Mr. Hughes grabbed her had and pulled it against his crotch. Instead of taking action against the perpetrator, the school district fired Ms. Crawford, a 30-year employee, along with two others. In the suit, she claimed that the school district retaliated against her for reporting the behavior of the supervisor, and she filed a claim with the EEOC, followed by an action in the U.S. District Court.
The lower court dismissed her action and the appellate court upheld the dismissal. The rationale was that she was merely answering questions by the investigators in an already pending internal investigation initiated by someone else, and was not engaged in protected activity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The appeals court added that the internal investigation was conducted by the employer and not by the EEOC.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and sided with Ms. Crawford. It held that the protections of the Civil Right Act of 1964 did apply to employees who simply cooperate in an internal investigation rather than file a formal complaint with the employer or a charge with the EEOC. More particularly, the Court said that the anti-retaliation provision’s protection extends to an employee who speaks out about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation.
In the opinion, Mr. Justice Souter explained that the term “oppose” as used in Title VII’s retaliation provision should be given its common dictionary definition, “to resist or antagonize…to contend against; to confront, resist; withstand.” Indeed, the court observed that an employee’s reported belief that an employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination virtually always constitutes “opposition” to the activity. The Court concluded that disclosing a supervisor’s inappropriate sexual conduct in response to the employer’s questions during an internal investigation was protected from retaliation. To hold otherwise would encourage employees to keep quiet about illegal activity during internal investigations for fear of reprisals, such as termination and thereby defeat public policy which promotes a sexual harassment-free work environment.
Now employees are protected from retaliation for activities other than filing a charge of discrimination or launching an internal complaint. Simply answering questions about discrimination in an investigation can be protected activities.
Because any subsequent adverse employment actions against employees may lead to retaliation claims, employers should ensure that the adverse actions are supported by legitimate business reasons and appropriate documentation and that similarly situated employees who have not engaged in conduct protected by Title VII have been treated in similar fashion so there is no disparity.